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1. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND ITS E-VOTING 
RECOMMENDATIONS
On the 30th  of September  2004,  the Council  of Europe  passed
the Recommendation for electronic voting, Rec(2004)111. It was the first attempt
to define  requirements  for  e-voting  systems,  which  also  includes  remote
voting  and  voting  machines.  Some  points  listed  in the recommendation
would prove to be  irrelevant  to the practical  implementation  for  e-voting
systems as they were of rather general nature equally concerning all voting
channels and methods.2 Yet it was the landmark attempt to define the legal,
operational  and  technical  standards  an e-voting  system  has  to follow
(Appendices  I–III).  The Explanatory  Memorandum  to Appendix  III
on the technical  standards  was  couched  in Common  Criteria  (CC)
terminology;  CC  is  a global  standard  for  the security  evaluation  and
certification of IT systems.3 Clear reference to CC terminology and structure
indicates  that  the Council  of Europe intended  the Recommendation
to become the basis for e-voting system certification. 
Building on a decade of practical experience of e-voting, CM/Rec(2017)54
provides  an update  that  equally  applies  to voting  machines  and  remote
(typically internet) voting. This paper uniquely focusses on the latter. It has
to be noted that there is no such thing as “e-voting”, but that there are many
systems  in place,  which  also  follow  vastly  different  protocols  and
algorithms.  It  also  has  to be  understood that  the correct  and meaningful
1 Recommendation  Rec(2004)11  of the Committee  of Ministers  to member  States  on legal,
operational  and  technical  standards  for e-voting,  30  September  2004.  Available  from:
https://www.coe.int/t/dgap/goodgovernance/Activities/Key-Texts/Recommendations/
Rec(2004)11_Eng_Evoting_and_Expl_Memo_en.pdf  [Accessed 16 June 2020].
2 Example includes,  “Possible registration requirements for e-voting shall not pose an impediment
to the voter participating in e-voting”, ibid, Appendix I, A. 2.;  “E-voting systems shall prevent
any voter from casting a vote by more than one voting channel”, ibid, A.6.;  “The e-voting system
shall not permit any manipulative influence to be exercised over the voter during the voting” , ibid,
Appendix III, 12.
3 Bagnato, D. (2019) The impact of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/REC(2017)5
on eVoting protocols. In: Nemeslaki, A., Prosser, A., Scola, D., Szadeczky, T. (eds.). Central
and Eastern European eDem and eGov Days 2019, Budapest, 2–3 May.
4 Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)5  of the Committee  of Ministers  to member  States
on standards for e-voting, 14 June 2017 (CM/Rec(2017)5), p. 2. Available from: https://rm.
coe.int/0900001680726f6f  [Accessed 17 April 2019].
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software implementation of the protocol has to be considered as well.5 This
paper  focusses  on the protocol  design  (not  the intricacies  of software
implementation) of e-voting systems in view of the Recommendation.  
After the release of the 2004 Recommendation several e-voting projects
in European  countries  failed,  including  Austria,6 United  Kingdom7 and
Finland,8 which  led  to a general  feeling  that  more  stringent
recommendations  were  needed.  The main  issues  surrounding  the failed
elections  could  be  summarised  as a lack  of reproducibility,  audibility,
general  verifiability,  transparency,  and  voter  secrecy.  In the Austrian
student  elections  2009,  the election  committee  was  unable  to perform its
duties because electronic election data had been destroyed and there was no
means  to verify  the election  results.  In Finland,  electronic  votes  went
missing, which clearly indicates a lack of audibility. In the UK, votes were
manually  edited  in clear  text  to fit  into  the counting  application9 and
the election  committee  could  not  follow  the procedures  for  opening
the ballot  box  and  counting  the votes.  Furthermore,  undocumented  data
transfers  during  an ongoing  election  were  observed.10 These  and  similar
events clearly necessitated a new and more stringent Recommendation. 
On the 14th  of June  2017,  the  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)5
of the Committee  of Ministers  to Member  States  on standards  for  e-voting  and
an explanatory memorandum11 and guidelines12 were passed. We hold that
5 Prosser, A. and Müller-Török, R. (2009) E-Voting: Lessons Learnt. In: Kaplan, B. and Aktan,
D. (eds.). International Conference on eGovernment and eGovernance, Ankara, pp. 265–280.
6 Constitutional Court. (2011) V 85-96/11-15, 13 December.
7 Actica  Consulting.  (2007)  Summary  of Technical  Assessments  of  May  2007  e-voting  Pilots.
[online] Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_
commission_pdf_file/0018/16191/Actica_Summary_27244-20136__E__N__S__W__.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2018].
8 Karhumäki, J. and Meskanen, T. (2008)  Audit Report on Pilot Electronic Voting in Municipal
Elections. University of Turku, Turku.
9 Actica Consulting. (2007) Technical Evaluation of Rushmoor Borough Council e-voting Pilot 2007.
[online]  Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_
commission_pdf_file/0019/16192/Actica_Rushmoor_27248-20137__E__N__S__W__.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2018].
10 Actica  Consulting.  (2007)  Summary  of Technical  Assessments  of May  2007  e-voting  Pilots.
[online]  Available  from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_
commission_pdf_file/0018/16191/Actica_Summary_27244-20136__E__N__S__W__.pdf
[Accessed 31 May 2018].
11 Explanatory  Memorandum  to Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)5  of the Committee
of Ministers to member States on standards for e-voting,  14 June 2017 (CM(2017)50-add1
final). Available from: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCT
MContent?documentId=090000168071bc84 [Accessed 17 April 2019].
12 Guidelines  on the implementation  of the provisions  of Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)5
on standards for e-voting, 14 June 2017 (CM(2017)50-add2final). Available from: https://rm.
coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001
680726c0b [Accessed 17 April 2019].
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the Recommendation,  for  the most  part,  streamlines  requirements  for
e-voting  in the context  of the practical  application  of an e-voting  system,
particularly  in the field  of voter  secrecy  as well  as (individual  and
collective) verifiability. 
2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REC(2004)11 AND 
CM/REC(2017)5
The relevant recommendations that relate to the technical core functioning
of e-voting are found in Appendix I, standards 1–26 of CM/Rec(2017)5. First
and  foremost,  the document  has  been  streamlined  with  the number
of standards  being  reduced  from  112  to 49.  Below  are  a number
of standards  that  were  added  to or expanded  in CM/Rec(2017)5
as compared to the 2004 recommendation. 
1) Defining the way in which voting information is to be presented.
In terms  of the user  interface,  this  recommendation  is  crucial.
Official  voting  information  is  to be  presented  in an equal  way
across  voting  channels  [CM/Rec(2017)5,  5]13.  This  may  lead
to unexpected  results:  Catering,  for  instance,  for  persons  with
disabilities, such as the visually impaired, by supporting a screen
reader would mean that the way information is presented needs
to be  changed  to make  it  accessible  and  this  breaches
CM/Rec(2017)5,  5.  Furthermore,  an e-voting  system  cannot
reasonably  be  seen  to maintain  voter  secrecy  under  these
conditions and hence poses a security breach. 
2) The voter  registry  and  its  requirements  for  e-voting  is  not
controlled  by the e-voting  system,  hence  Rec(2004)11,  2  was
rightfully  omitted.  CM/Rec(2017)5  expanded  its  requirements
to enforce  that  the system  authenticate  a person  as having
the right to vote [CM/Rec(2017)5, 8] before accessing the e-voting
system. This was indirectly addressed by Rec(2004)11, 80 and 94
but has been reworded to specifically apply to the voter. 
3) The function of an electronic ballot box differs considerably to that
of the physical  ballot  box  in traditional  voting.  The electronic
ballot  box  stores  votes  cast,  including  redundant  votes  created
13 In the following, CM/Rec(2017)5, x refers to Standard x of the Recommendation. The same
applies to Rec(2004)11. In accordance with Council of Europe practice we equally use CM/Rec
and Rec.
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through the voter’s right to cast a vote up to an arbitrary number
of times.  During  the vote-counting  stage,  the system  sorts
the votes discarding redundant votes and counts only the last vote
cast per voter, irrespective of how many times a voter voted and
includes  only  that  last  vote  in the final  election  results
[CM/Rec(2017)5, 9]. 
 4) The e-voting  system  is  required  to alert  the voter  if he  or she
attempts to cast an invalid vote, giving the voter the option to cast
a valid vote [CM/Rec(2017)5, 14]. This however means that “paper
voters” and electronic voters are not treated the same way, as such
an alert does not exist for postal or paper-based presence voting. 
5) A requirement that presents itself in the 2017 recommendations is
the need for collective verifiability in that each vote is accurately
included  in the election  results  and  it  must  be  verifiable
independently from the e-voting system [CM/Rec(2017)5, 17 and
18]. 
6) The voter  shall  be  able  to verify  that  his  or her  intention  is
accurately  represented  in the vote  [individual  verifiability,
CM/Rec(2017)5,  15].  Please  note  that  individual  verifiability
reaches  until  the vote  enters  the ballot  box  and  general
verifiability reaches until the election result.
7) E-voting system stores only personal information that is necessary
to conduct  the election  [CM/Rec(2017)5,  20].  Depending
on the protocol,  very  little  personal  information  is  needed,
because  the system  only  needs  to identify  the user  as having
the right to vote, possibly assign a constituency (if any) and record
that the user has voted at least once. 
8) The recommendation  on the confidentiality  of the voter’s  register
has been expanded slightly to allow for accessibility by authorised
parties [compare Rec(2004)11, 78 and CM/Rec(2017)5, 22]. 
9) The 2004 recommendation did not take into account the possibility
for a voter to vote several times and so the 2017 recommendations
has included this requirement. It asks that
“E-voting shall ensure that the secrecy of previous choices recorded and
erased by the voter before issuing his or her final vote is respected”
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in CM/Rec(2017)5,  25.  However,  here  the standard  does  not
accurately  correspond to the technical  functioning  of an e-voting
system  for  no  vote/choice  is  erased  by the system,  if it  is  to be
secure  and  auditable.  The previous  choices  are  not  included
in the final  election  results  but  they are  stored  in the ballot  box
and  nobody  has  the right  to erase  or change  a vote  cast  at any
stage  of the election  process  for  this  would  be  a clear  breach
of security, cf. CM/Rec(2017)5, 24.  
The essence  of the improvements  can  be  summarised  by verifiability,
Standards 15, 17, 18 and a strengthening of voting secrecy, Standards 19, 20,
25  and –  most  prominently –  26,  with  some  emphasis  on usability,
recommendations 5 and 14.
3. HOW TO MEASURE AN E-VOTING SYSTEM'S VIABILITY
An e-voting system is defined by the protocol it implements. The protocol is
the basis for its core functionality and determines to what extent the system
will  be  able  to fulfil  the requirements  of CM/Rec(2017)5.  The first  step  is
to define the dimensions and then to assess the extent to which an e-voting
protocol  fulfils  the dimensional  requirements.  Using  the recommendation
of the Council  of Europe,  CM/Rec(2017)5,  the following  dimensions  can  be
distinguished:14
A. Equal suffrage: 
1. The unique identification of voters [CM/Rec(2017)5, 7];
2. Access granted only to authenticated voters [CM/Rec(2017)5, 8];
3. Only  the appropriate  number  of votes  per  voter  are  stored
in the electronic ballot box [CM/Rec(2017)5, 9].
B. Individual verifiability includes:
1. Verification by the voter that the voters’ intention is accurately
represented by the vote and that the “sealed vote” has entered
the ballot box without being altered [CM/Rec(2017)5, 15]; 
14 This  section builds  upon the general  modelling method introduced in Prosser,  A.  (2014)
Transparency  in eVoting –  Lessons  learnt.  Transforming  Government:  People,  Process  and
Policy, 8 (2), pp. 171–184.
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2. Voter  confirmation  that  the vote  has  been  cast  successfully
[CM/Rec(2017)5, 16].
C. General verifiability includes:
1. Sound evidence must be provided,  “that each authentic vote is
accurately  included  in the [...] results” and  be  independently
verifiable from the e-voting system [CM/Rec(2017)5, 17];
2. Sound  evidence  must  be  provided  that  “only  eligible  voters’
votes have been included in the [...] result” and be independently
verifiable from the e-voting system [CM/Rec(2017)5, 18].
It should be noted that B and C cover protection against manipulation,15
however  distinguishes  between  the type  of verification  following
the systematisation in CM/Rec(2017)5. 
D. Secret suffrage includes:
1. Ensuring  the secrecy  of previous  voting  choices  made
by the voter before issuing his or her final vote [CM/Rec(2017)
5, 25];
2. Anonymity  of votes,  notably  that  the unsealed  vote  and
the voter  cannot  be  linked during  counting.  [CM/Rec(2017)5,
26]; 
3. Ensuring  “that  the secrecy  of the vote  be  respected  at all  stages
of the voting procedure” [CM/Rec(2017)5, 19].
E. Anti-coercion:
1. Not providing the voter with proof of the content of a vote cast
“for use by third parties” [CM/Rec(2017)5, 23].
F. No premature disclosure of election results:
1. Secrecy of the number of votes for any voting option is  to be
maintained until  after the closure of the electronic  ballot box.
[CM/Rec(2017)5, 24].
15 Prosser,  A.  (2014)  Transparency  in eVoting –  Lessons  learnt.  Transforming  Government:
People, Process and Policy, 8 (2), pp. 171–184.
282 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 14:2
Each  of these  dimensions  may  be  protected  by purely  organisational
or by technical means. The former means separation of control, data access
restrictions in an application, usage of certified personnel, legal provisions
etc.  Organisational  protection  ultimately  relies  on people  playing
by the book;  it  relies  on the fact  that  not  a single  individual  or coalition
of individuals  may  break  the security  of the system.  Technical  protection
typically  means  cryptographic  security  that  cannot  be  broken  by any
coalition  of actors.16 Therefore,  the level  up  to which  each  of the above
dimensions A–F is protected by technical means indicates a security frontier
for an e-voting system.
It  has  to be  understood  that  at some  stage,  organisational  protection
must  be  employed,  there  can  be  no  100 %  technical  security.  However,
the question  is,  when  the organisational  safeguards  are  needed.  Two
dimensions appear to be relevant in this context; both concern a violation
of Dimensions  A–F above (in a generalised  way referred to as “violation”
below):
1. How many votes may be violated by organisational means?
a. The entire election (as far as conducted electronically);
b. The content of one (virtual) ballot box, i.e. a ward;
c. A single vote.
2. Who can violate successfully?
a. A single person in whatever capacity (“hot” candidates would
be  a system  administrator  or members  of the election
committee);
b. A coalition  of persons  without  the voter,  e.g. the election
committee in its entirety;
c. A coalition including the voter/s concerned.
Let  us  assign  levels  1  to 3  to combinations  of the two  violation
dimensions  in as far  as the e-voting  system  does  not  provide  technical
protection  (for  which  organisational  protection  must  apply).  We operate
16 Here we disregard the fact that over time key lengths may become obsolete and may be
broken. This risk may be minimised by using cryptographic keys with a sufficiently large
“buffer time” until their length becomes obsolete. 
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under the assumption that there is  one (logical)  electronic ballot box per
ward, which is controlled by one election committee.
How many votes?
Entire ward Single vote No vote
How many actors? Single actor 1 1 3
Coalition w/o v. 1 2 3
Coalition /w v.17 2 2 3
Table 1: Levels of manipulation that the technical
safeguards of the e-voting system allow
“Violation” in this context means the undetected (hence successful) and
directed  violation  of any  of the Dimensions  A–F.  Detected violation
of a dimension does not count as violation in the above systematization as it
may  entail  an enormous  backlash  including  repetition  of the election  but
does not imply the successful violation of the dimension and the underlying
election principle. To assign a value to the dimension, the first line in Table 1
(single  actor)  is  analysed.  If a single  actor  can  violate  the dimension  for
the ward  or a single  vote,  a value  of 1  is  assigned  to the dimension  and
the analysis of the dimension stops; otherwise (“no vote” in line one), line
two  (coalition  of actors  without  a voter,  e.g. the election  committee
or a subset thereof) is analysed the same way; if it also yields “no vote”, line
three is analysed. An example: Assume that Dimension D (voting secrecy) is
completely  (technically)  protected against  single  actor  violation  and that
a coalition without the voter can violate the dimension for the entire ward:
Line one yields a value of 3, hence line two is analysed, which yields a value
of 1 for the dimension and the analysis stops. This procedure is repeated for
all  dimensions.  Summarising,  Figure  1  presents  a model  for  mapping
the resulting  security  frontier  following  a systematisation  proposed
by Prosser.18 There  are  Dimensions  A  to F  and  values  of 1  to 3  in each
dimension.
Remark:  The interested  reader  is  invited  to insert  his  or her  own
classification  in the above  systematisation.  The model  is  also  flexible
enough to include additional or fewer dimensions or to provide for a finer
distinction,  for  instance  with  a defined  subgroup  of votes  cast  in a ward
17 Meaning with all the respective voter/s concerned.
18 Prosser,  A.  (2014)  Transparency  in eVoting –  Lessons  learnt.  Transforming  Government:
People, Process and Policy, 8 (2), pp. 171–184.
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as additional  level of compromising votes.  The values in Table 1  represent
our take of the severity of violations and will be suitable for the following
discussion of the two protocol families.
The hypothetical  system depicted in Figure 1  provides  high protection
of equal suffrage, for instance by using a citizen card for voter identification
and  cryptographic  protection  for  the data  link  between  voter  and
constituency  assignment.  Individual  verifiability  is  on a low  level,  for
instance,  a single  person could  fool  voters  into  believing  that  their  vote
reached  the ballot  box  correctly,  where  in fact  it  was  altered.  General
verifiability  is  on a medium  level,  for  instance  the election  committee
of a ward  could  collude  to provide  a false  audit  trail  for  the correctness
of the result  of their  ward  with  respect  to an individual  vote.  Protection
of voting secrecy is minimal, again a single person could break it for a ward.
Anti-coercion protection is equally minimal, vote buying by a single person
would effectively be possible. Premature disclosure of results however, has
the highest protection level. 
We  hold  that  this  model  is  (i)  useful  to quickly  map  the abilities
of a voting protocol  in view of the requirements  set  out  in CM/Rec(2017)5
and (ii) flexible enough to be adapted and/or refined to more specific needs
in this  regard,  for  instance  selection  of an e-voting  system  in a tendering
procedure. 
Figure 1: Model of the aims of an e-voting system – hypothetical example
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4. TRADE-OFFS
4.1. INDIVIDUAL VERIFIABILITY AND WAYS TO DETER VOTE 
BUYING
The CM/Rec(2017)5,  19,  recommends  the secrecy  of the vote  be  respected
at all stages of the voting procedure. However, this presents a conflict with
CM/Rec(2017)5, 15, which requires that the voter be able to verify the vote
and  verify  that  the vote  has  entered  the ballot  box  without  alteration.
Finally, CM/Rec(2017)5, 23 contrasts in that
“An e-voting system shall  not  provide the voter  with proof  of the content
of the vote cast for use by third parties”.   
It becomes evident that these requirements create two goal conflicts, that
of individual  verifiability versus anti-coercion and individual  verifiability
versus secret suffrage. These conflicts have been realised very early on.19 It
should  be  understood  that  individual  verifiability  may  create  conflicts
in terms  of voting  secrecy,  for  in order  to verify  the vote  cast,  the voter
would  need to receive  confirmation  of the actual  vote  cast  to validate  its
correctness;  this  could  be  checked  by a third  party  buying  the vote
or coercing the voter. However, this equally applies to postal voting.20
However, on a very general level, it is not possible to stop voters from
recording  in some  format  their  vote;  this  also  applies  to polling  booth
voting as well. The moment a voter has the ability to check the authenticity
of a vote, voter secrecy is compromised paving the way for voter coercion.
Voter buying relies on proof in some format that the vote cast is  the vote
that was bought. In this light, measures could be taken in terms of system
procedures  that  would  question  the authenticity  of the vote  recorded for
use  by third  parties,  by allowing  only  the ability  to verify  a vote  when
having the option to change it. So, one could never be sure if the verification
recorded by the voter for use by third parties was the final vote actually cast
or not.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to CM/Rec(2017)5 in relation to Standard 23
of the recommendation  outlines  concerns  where  voter  secrecy  could  be
19 Cf.  Cohen,  J.  and  Fischer,  M.  (1985)  A robust  and  verifiable  cryptographically  secure
election scheme. In:  26th Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science, October 21–23,
IEEE, pp. 373–382.
20 Müller-Török, R. (2019) The Principles Established by the Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5
on Standards for E-Voting Applied to Other Channels of Remote Voting. Masaryk University
Journal of Law and Technology, 13 (1),  pp. 3–26.
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compromised.  From  this  list,  compromised  voting  secrecy  could  be
summarised: 
1. Through some form of remote access to computers via the internet
such as a computer virus to collect and record voter transactions;
2. The voter physically breaches voter secrecy by using some means
to create a copy of the vote and distribute it. 
It is very difficult  to control every aspect of remote voting particularly
internet connected computers and although the ability to disable  printing
and print screen functionalities, erasing user interaction through input and
output  devices  such  as keyboards,  mice  and  screens,  can  be  realised.
Ultimately it is up to the voters to take responsibility for the security of their
computers and in doing so voter secrecy. The same applies to postal voting,
where the ballot should perhaps also not be filled in in public. 
It  must  be  understood  that  if one  can  see  the vote,  one  can  record
the vote  and  the voting  process  via  devices  that  are  not  physically
connected to the voting device, such as photographing the screen and video
recording  the entire  procedure.  The same  applies  to paper-based  voting,
whereby, for instance, in Austria it is perfectly legal to take a photo of one’s
own  vote  and  post  it  on social  media.21 At this  stage,  it  is  not  possible
to prevent  this  from  happening,  but  to focus  on defining  e-voting
procedures  making  vote  buying  or coercion  more  difficult.  Here  some
technical suggestions we find useful from an implementation perspective:
1. Deter photographing and printing of votes, enable multiple vote
casting
Enable  multiple  voting,  something  that  is  impossible  to realise
in postal  voting  procedures.  Furthermore,  in voting  multiple
times,  there  should  be  no  indication  on the screen  of the voting
device as to how many times the voter has voted. Even if the voter
took a photo of the screen or even a screen shot and printed it out
to validate  his  vote,  the information  displayed  should  not  give
the viewer  any  indication  as to whether  the vote  displayed  is
21 Pichler,  G.  (2019)  Darf  man  seinen  ausgefüllten  Wahlzettel  auf  Instagram  teilen?
Der Standard, 25 May. [online] Available from: https://www.derstandard.at/story/200010364
6954/darf-man-seinen-ausgefuellten-wahlzettel-auf-instagram-teilen  [Accessed 16 June 2020].
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the final  vote  cast.  This  would  at least  provide  doubt
as to the authenticity of the final vote shown to a third party. 
2. Deter recording the voting process
When recording the entire process via video camera for example,
restrictions  can  be  set  requiring  that  before  changing  a vote,
the voter  must  wait  a  certain  number  of hours  before  being
allowed to change the vote, making the recording process difficult
and  tedious  at best  and  the authenticity  of the proof  provided
by the voter would still be questionable. 
3. Deter bulk voting
Restrictions  could  be  placed  on how  many  voters  can  access
the voter  registry  and/or  actually  vote  from  any  one  computer
or device.  This  could  be  done  by recording  the (physical)  MAC
address  of the PC  or device,  separate  from  any  identification
information of the person voting. This  would deter people from
buying  the right  to vote  on behalf  of voters  by having  bought
the identification needed to register and then voting for a group
of people  from  any  one  PC.  Also,  this  would  be  a huge
improvement as compared to postal voting.22
4.2. SECRET SUFFRAGE VS. EQUAL SUFFRAGE
A system  perfectly  gauged  to protect  equal  suffrage  can  be  built  but  it
would  completely  denigrate  voting  secrecy.  An example  would  be
the Austrian  electronic  citizens’  initiative  system,  where  supporters
of a citizens’  initiative  sign  with  their  electronic  signature  cards.23
In contrast  to hand-written  signatures,  these  signatures  can  be  reliably
verified.  Voter  secrecy  is  not  an issue  here,  as it  is  a citizens’  initiative.
22 Cf. the horrendous number of bulk voting cases documented in the U.K., cf. White, I. and
Coleman,  Ch.  (2011)  Postal  Voting  & Electoral  Fraud,  SN/PC/3667,  House  of Commons
Library,  and a recent case in Germany, cf. Landgericht Regensburg.  (2018)  Strafverfahren
wegen Verdachts der Wahlmanipulation in Geiselhöring.  [press release] 15 October. Available
from:  https://www.justiz.bayern.de/gerichte-und-behoerden/landgericht/regensburg/presse
/2018/7.php [accessed 2 November 2018], all involving bulk postal voting.
23 Stein, R. and Wenda, G. (2014) Das Zentrale Wählerregister – Ein skalierbares Instrument
zur  Bürgerbeteiligung  mit  1:1-Verifikation.  In:  Plodereder,  E.,  Grunske,  L.,  Ull,  D.  and
Schneider,  E.  (eds.).  44.  Jahrestagung  der  Gesellschaft  für  Informatik. INFORMATIK  2014,
22–26. September, Bonn, pp. 1427−1436.  [online]  Available from: https://subs.emis.de/LNI/
Proceedings/Proceedings232/1427.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
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The essence  of every  e-voting  protocol  is  to balance  secrecy  and  reliable
identification, which are clear trade-offs there.24
In the following sections, two voting protocol families are discussed with
a view to the Recommendation and the security model in Figure 1. They can
be  distinguished  by one  “watershed”  property,  that  is  when
the anonymization of the vote takes place – before or after  the vote is  put
in the electronic ballot box. 
5. ENVELOPING PROTOCOLS 
Enveloping  protocols  have  been  widely  implemented,  probably  because
of their  intuitive  appeal  due  to the emulation  of postal  voting,  and
as an example we will take a look at the Estonian e-voting system,25 which
has been implemented in elections in Estonia since 2005.26
It should also be noted that the authors of CM/Rec(2017)5 due to some
wording appear to have had an envelope protocol in mind when drafting
the new recommendation, cf. for example Standard 15:
“The voter  shall  be  able  to verify  that  his  or her  intention  is  accurately
represented  in the vote  and that  the sealed  vote  has  entered the electronic
ballot box […])”;
Standard 26:
“[…]  in such  a way  that  it  is  not  possible  to reconstruct  a link  between
the unsealed vote and the voter […])”;
or Standard 45:
“Votes and voter information shall be kept sealed until the counting process
commences”.
24 Maaten, E. (2004) Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case. In: Prosser, A.  and  Krimmer, R.
(eds.).  Electronic Voting in Europe – Technology, Law, Politics and Society, GI-Edition, Lecture
Notes in Informatics, pp. 83–90.
25 Cf.  State  Electoral  Office  of Estonia.  (2017)  General  Framework  of Electronic  Voting  and
Implementation  thereof  at National  Elections  in Estonia,  Document:  IVXV-ÜK-1.0,  Tallin.
[online] Available from: https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/eng/IVXV-UK
-1.0-eng.pdf  [Accessed  16  June  2020]  and  Springall,  D.,  Finkenauer,  T.,  Durumeric,  Z.,
Kitcat,  J.,   Hursti,  H.,   MacAlpine,  M.  and  Halderman,  J.A.  (2014)  Security  Analysis
of the Estonian Internet Voting System. In:  CCS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC
Conference  on Computer  and  Communications  Security,  ACM.  [online] Available  from:
https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
26 Maaten, E. (2004) Towards remote e-voting: Estonian case. In: Prosser, A.  and  Krimmer, R.
(eds.).  Electronic Voting in Europe – Technology, Law, Politics and Society, GI-Edition, Lecture
Notes in Informatics, pp. 83–90.
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This  is  arguably  due  to the fact  that  enveloping  protocols  are
comparatively  easy  to implement  and  have  dominated  the first  wave
of e-voting systems. 
The envelope e-voting process can be split into three stages:
5.1. CASTING A VOTE
The voter authenticates him- or herself vis à vis the voting application using
an eID. This is not part of the e-voting protocol proper. 
The voter selects option/s on the ballot. The voting client selects a large
random number r and constructs a pad from it, pad(r).27 The voter’s vote and
pad(r),  together  as a “package“,  are  encrypted  using  the public  key
of the election committee, and this creates the inner envelope.28,  29 The voter
then  confirms  his  vote  by digitally  signing  the inner  envelope  with  his
or her  eID  (digital  signature  card)  creating  a second  layer  known
as the outer envelope.30 The outer envelope containing the inner envelope is
sent  to the server  and  the voting  client  shows  a QR-code  containing
the voter ID and r, which enables the voter to verify and/or change his vote
a maximum  of three  times  for  up  to 30  minutes  after  casting  his  initial
vote.31
5.2. INDIVIDUAL VERIFICATION
To verify and/or to change the vote, the voter scans in the QR-code (that is
his  voter  ID  and  random  r)  using  a different  device  (typically  a smart
phone) from which he initially voted and the smart device sends the voter
27 That  is  to ensure  that  even  if two votes  vote  for  the same option/s,  they  look  different
in encoded state.
28 Cf.  State  Electoral  Office  of Estonia.  (2017)  General  Framework  of Electronic  Voting  and
Implementation thereof at National Elections in Estonia,  Document: IVXV-ÜK-1.0, Tallin, p. 7.
[online] Available from: https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/eng/IVXV-UK
-1.0-eng.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
29 Cf. Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J.,  Hursti, H.,  MacAlpine, M. and
Halderman, J. A. (2014) Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System. In:  CCS
'14:  Proceedings  of the 2014  ACM  SIGSAC  Conference  on Computer  and  Communications
Security,  ACM,  p. 705.  [online]  Available  from: https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-
ccs14.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
30 Cf.  State  Electoral  Office  of Estonia.  (2017)  General  Framework  of Electronic  Voting  and
Implementation thereof at National Elections in Estonia,  Document: IVXV-ÜK-1.0, Tallin, p. 7.
[online] Available from: https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/eng/IVXV-UK
-1.0-eng.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
31 Cf. Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J.,  Hursti, H.,  MacAlpine, M. and
Halderman, J. A. (2014) Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System. In:  CCS
'14:  Proceedings  of the 2014  ACM  SIGSAC  Conference  on Computer  and  Communications
Security,  ACM,  p. 706.  [online]  Available  from: https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-
ccs14.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
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ID to the electronic ballot box. From the ID, the ballot box identifies the vote
stored in the system and sends it back. The encrypted vote as well as a list
of all  the possible  voting  options  (parties,  candidates  or options
at a referendum)  are  received  by the smart  device,  which  encrypts  all
the possible  combinations  for  the options  and the pad(r) with  the original
public  key  used  to encrypt  the vote  and  compares  it  with  the voters’
intended choice. If there is a match the option is displayed. This mechanism
is used to verify what is in the encrypted inner envelope.32
5.3. COUNTING
First the digital signature in the outer envelope and whether the voter has
already  cast  a vote  are  checked.  Then  outer  and  inner  envelope  are
“separated”  and  the encrypted  votes  of the inner  envelope  are  stored
on a DVD  and  transferred  to a separate  machine  that  decrypts  the vote
using the private key of the election committee. Finally, the decrypted votes
are counted.33 Figure 2 schematically depicts this process.
Figure 2: Envelope e-voting system34
32 Estonian National Electoral Committee.  (2010)  E-Voting System – General Overview, Tallin,
2005–2010.  [online] Available  from: https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/
eng/General_Description_E-Voting_2010.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
33 Cf. Springall, D., Finkenauer, T., Durumeric, Z., Kitcat, J.,  Hursti, H.,  MacAlpine, M. and
Halderman, J. A. (2014) Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System. In:  CCS
'14:  Proceedings  of the 2014  ACM  SIGSAC  Conference  on Computer  and  Communications
Security,  ACM,  p. 706.  [online]  Available  from: https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-
ccs14.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
34 Estonian National Electoral Committee.  (2010)  E-Voting System – General Overview, Tallin,
2005–2010, p. 10, Figure 2. [online] Available from: https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/
files/uploads/eng/General_Description_E-Voting_2010.pdf [Accessed 16 June 2020].
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5.4. THE ENVELOPE PROTOCOL AND CM/REC(2017)5
Figure 3 depicts the enveloping protocol assessment according to the model
in Table 1 and Figure 1:
Equal  suffrage  is  protected  if an eID  is  used  to authenticate  voters.
Thereby  it  is  readily  possibly  to prevent  voters  from  illegally  casting
multiple votes. This ID also determines the constituency for which the vote
may be cast.
Individual verifiability is implemented in a rather roundabout way with
the QR  code  and  it  should  be  clear  that  in the case  of complex  voting
schemes with a large number of preferential votes, this mechanism does not
scale well.35 However, voters may check whether the vote reached the ballot
box correctly; they may not check whether the vote stays there and enters
the result correctly, which however is not required by CM/Rec(2017)5, 15!
Therefore, the protocol gets a full score here.
General verifiability however cannot be guaranteed. The big weakness
of this protocol family is that the ballot box contains the information how
a voter  voted  (whereby  the “how”  is  encrypted  with  the public  key
of the election committee). If the private key of the election committee and
the ballot box with the votes containing the outer envelope were ever to be
brought together, one could find out how every single voter voted. This
could  be  done  by a single  person,  e.g. a fraudulent  administrator,
35 Cf.  Bagnato,  D.  (2019)  The  impact  of the Council  of Europe  Recommendation  CM/REC
(2017)5 on eVoting protocols. In: Nemeslaki, A., Prosser, A., Scola, D., Szadeczky, T. (eds.).
Central and Eastern European eDem and eGov Days 2019, Budapest, 2–3 May, pp. 59–69.
Figure 3: Enveloping protocol
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or a coalition  without  the voter,  most  notably  a collusive  election
committee. This is  also the reason why an independent recount is  simply
not possible: 
- It  would  either  mean  to pass  the ballot  box  plus  private  key
of the election committee to an independent authority hoping that
this authority does not misuse this information, or
- It  would  mean  that  the independent  authority  to conduct
the recount  gets  the unsealed  votes,  which  could  also  be
manufactured  by the election  committee,  part  thereof
or a fraudulent administrator (i.e. a single actor). 
For  the same  reason,  voting  secrecy  can  only  be  guaranteed  as long
as the ballot  box  and  the private  key  of the election  committee  are  not
joined.  This  has  to be  ascertained  by organisational  means.  Therefore,
Dimensions  “general  verifiability”  and  “secret  suffrage”  get  the lowest
score possible.
Anti-coercion  is  generally  difficult  to guarantee  in remote  voting
procedures,  electronic  or paper-based,  as discussed  above.  However,
the QR code solution enables a coercer or vote buyer to check the “correct”
vote. However, this is only possible for a single vote each time and involves
cooperation by the voter, hence value 2 in Figure 3.
Premature  disclosure  of the ballot  can  be  controlled  to some  extent
by the application of the private key of the election committee, if a protocol
of key decomposition is followed, where each election committee member
holds a part of the key which is then assembled.36, 37 Otherwise a single actor
could  apply  the private  key  to ”open”  the ballots  of the entire  ward.
However, in both cases the lowest value in Table 1 applies. 
6. TOKEN-BASED PROTOCOLS 
A token  protocol  implements  a two-staged  process.  The first  stage  is
to attain a valid, signed voting card (token), which allows the voter to cast
a vote at any stage during the voting period. The second stage is to vote via
36 Cf.  Blakley,  R.  (1979)  Safeguarding  cryptographic  keys.  In:  IEEE  (eds.).  International
Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK), New York, 4–7 June, pp. 313–317.
37 Cf. Prosser, A., Kofler, R., Krimmer, R. and Unger, M. K. (2004) Implementation of Quorum-
-Based Decisions  in an Election  Committee.  In:  Traunmüller,  R.  (ed.).  Proceedings
of DEXA/EGOV  2004,  Lecture  Notes  in Computer  Science  LNCS  3183,  Springer,  Berlin,
pp. 122–127.
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an electronic  ballot  sheet  using  the token  attained  in the first  stage.
In the following the protocol presented in Prosser and Müller-Török  (2002) is
taken as a reference.38
6.1. CREATION OF THE TOKEN
The voter  first  identifies  himself  to the election system. This  can be done
by any current  means  of identification;  in the context  of political  elections
an eID  would  typically  be  used.  The voting  application  then  generates
a very large random number as token t and submits it to the election system
for  a blind  signature.39 The blind  signature  gives  an authentic  signature
on the token,  nevertheless  the server  never  sees  the token  it  signs.
In the physical world this would correspond to inserting a document to be
signed  into  a carbon  paper-lined  envelope  and  sealing  the envelope.
The signor  signs  on the envelope  and  the signature  imprints  itself  onto
the document –  there  is  an authentic  signature  by the signor,  who
nevertheless  never  sees  what  he  signed.  Blind  signatures  achieve  this
in the world  of cryptography.  However,  in contrast  to the physical
envelope,  the cryptographic  “seal”  cannot  the broken.  The election
administration uses an asymmetric key pair (e.g. following the RSA protocol)
of (e, d, m) with e being the external/public, d the domestic/private key and
m the modulus.40 The voter now has a voting card VC=[t, td]. 
The same  process  can  be  repeated  with  an election  observer  using
a second RSA key pair (e, d, m) adding another signature to the voting card.
At the end  of the first  stage,  the voter  possesses  a token  validly  signed
by the election  system  and  by the observer  VC=[t,  td,  td].  If several
constituencies have to be served, the server maintains a key pair (e, d, m)
per constituency and the constituency C is  added to the VC=[t,  td(C),td,  C].
Of course, also several election observers could be used and the respective
blind signatures concatenated in the token. To prevent misuse of the token
38 Prosser,  A.  and  Müller-Török,  R.  (2002)  E-Democracy:  Eine  neue  Qualität
im demokratischen Entscheidungsprozess. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 44 (6), pp. 545–556.
39 Chaum, D. (1981) Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms.
Communications of the ACM, 24 (2), pp. 84–86.
40 RSA signatures/encryption are done in a residue class ring modulo a very large number.
Hence,  a key  “pair”  always  consists  of private  key,  public  key  and  modulus.  For
an introduction, we would recommend to directly go back to the classic [see Rivest, R. L.,
Shamir,  A.,  Adleman,  L.  A Method  for  Obtaining  Digital  Signatures  and  Public-Key
Cryptosystems.  Communications  of the ACM,  21 (2)].  Please  note  that  a blind  signature
according  to Chaum  (Ibid)  is  always  executed  on the full  text  not  a hash  of the full  text
as done in open (standard digital) signatures. 
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it  can  be  saved  symmetrically  (=password)  encrypted  on the local  file
system, for instance using AES.41
6.2. VOTING
VC is the only means of identification the voter uses when casting a vote.
Hence, anonymization happens before the vote is inserted in the ballot box.
The ballot  box (server)  checks the voter  authentication in VC by checking
the digital signature/s (t, td) and, if used, (t, td), by applying the public keys
of the election authority  e42 and the observer  e.  Also, the ballot box verifies
whether the token t has already been used. After verification the voter gets
the ballot  sheet  of the respective  constituency.  The ballot  sheet  is  filled
in and  inextricably  linked  to the VC,  for  instance  via  a hash  or other
concatenation methods. The entire vote is  then encrypted with the public
key of the election committee and submitted to the ballot box. 
6.3. COUNTING
The votes in the ballot box are already anonymous, and are only validated
by  a correctly  signed  VC  to which  they  are  concatenated.  Counting
therefore involves the following steps:43
1. Decrypting  the ballots  with  the private  key  of the election
committee;
2. Validating the concatenation of VC and ballot sheet;
3. Checking that the token was used only once;
4. Checking  the signatures  of election  system  and  observer/s
on the VC according to their public keys;
5. Checking the validity of the ballot and including it in the tally. 
Since  the  electronic  ballot  box  does  not  contain  any  information
on the voter,  it  can  be  transferred  to a third  party  for  an independent
recount.  Moreover,  the election  authority  could  publish  VCs  and  votes
in a table  (e.g. on a web  site  per  ward)  to enable  verification  containing
41 National  Institute  of Standards  and  Technology.  (2001)  Federal  Information  Processing
Standards  Publication  197,  ADVANCED  ENCRYPTION  STANDARD  (AES).  [online]
Available from: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf 
[Accessed 16 June 2020].
42 Note  that  a voter  cannot  fraudulently  modify  the constituency  as then  the public  key  e
of the new (modified) constituency would not work anymore.
43 Prosser,  A  (2014)  Transparency  in eVoting –  Lessons  learnt.  Transforming  Government:
People, Process and Policy, 8 (2), pp. 171–184.
2020] R. Müller-Török, D. Bagnato, A. Prosser: Council of Europe ... 295
the authenticated  voting  card,  the filled-in  ballot  sheet  and
the concatenation hash linking both as shown in Table 2.
VC
1
 = [t, td(C),td , C] Ballot1 Hash1
VC
2
 = [t, td(C),td, C] Ballot2 Hash2
VC
3
 = [t, td(C),td, C] Ballot3 Hash3
... ... ...
Table 2: Publication of votes in a token protocol
6.4. THE TOKEN PROTOCOL AND CM/REC(2017)5
Figure  4 shows  the degree  to which  the dimensions  from
the Recommendation are fulfilled. 
If an eID  or similar  means  of authentication  is  used,  respect  for
the principle of equal suffrage is fulfilled; the discussion is the same as with
the enveloping protocol.
The degree of individual verifiability of token systems indeed does not
only fulfil the requirements of CM/Rec(2017)5, it goes way beyond. To see
that  consider  Table  2  and  Figure  5.  CM/Rec(2017)5  requires  general
verifiability  as an “end-to-end”  solution  right  to the election  result.
Individual verifiability, however, is only required until the ballot box, not
the end  result.44 With  a token  protocol  however,  as votes  are  already
anonymous when they reach the ballot box, the very content of the ballot
box  could  be  published  on a website,  probably  organised  by the ward
44 Maybe  having  an envelope  protocol  type  in mind,  where  such  end-to-end  individual
verifiability would indeed be unthinkable. 
Figure 4: Token protocol score
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to enable  easier  access  by the voters.  For  each vote  in the ballot  box,  VC,
vote  and  concatenation  information  is  published  as depicted  in Table  2.
The voter  can  now  readily  access  the web  site  and search  for  his  or her
token and verify,  whether it  entered the tally correctly. This can be done
without  compromising  voting  secrecy  only  using  the token  as a means
of identifying  the vote.45 In this  context  token  protocols  reach  a degree
of individual verifiability that is not only higher than that of postal voting,
but also than that of conventional polling station voting.
In this  list  of published  votes,  individual  verifiability  is the “row-wise
check” each individual voter can perform. General verifiability would be
the “column-wise  check”  verifying  all  votes  in the ward  published  with
the following verification steps:
a. Each token entered the tally once;
b. Each  token  is  properly  authenticated  by the election  authority
and, if used, by the observer/s;
c. Each vote is concatenated with a valid token;
d. The vote  count  published  by the election  authority  can  be
reproduced with this published list and therefore be verified; 
e. Comparison  between  the number  of authenticated  tokens  and
the number  of tokens  issued  by the election  authority  and
the observer/s ensures that no tokens/votes have been suppressed
or inserted. 
In contrast  to envelope procedures  an independent  recount  is  possible
because  publishing  the ballot  box  does  not  contain  the information  how
voters  voted  and  hence  does  not  compromise  voting  secrecy.  Every
45 This could be offered in a ”pure” function using  Ctrl+F  search for one‘s token on the web
site and/or with a more amenable search functionality. 
Figure 5: Individual vs. general verifiability in Rec(2017)5
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organisation  interested  and  “civil  society”  in general  may  do  that  with
a comparatively modest cryptographic  toolset  being necessary.  Of course,
open source tools for independent recounts can also be expected to emerge.
In both verifiability dimensions the score is hence 3.
Secret  suffrage  is  protected  by the fact  that  nowhere  in the server
landscape  of the election  system  the information  how  a voter  voted  is
stored.  The basis  of authentication  is  the token  signed  by the election
authority  and  the observer/s.  No  organisational  means  are  necessary
to protect secrecy. The only time, when the system “sees” voter information
and token in the same transaction, the token is cryptographically (therefore
technically,  not  organisationally)  protected  by the blind  signature
algorithm. The token is authentically signed without the signor ever seeing
the token. That is also the reason why the ballot box as well as the private
key of the election  committee  can be  passed  on after  the election  without
compromising voting secrecy.
Anti-coercion is  only moderately protected as with any remote voting
scheme.  However,  the token  may  be  used  several  times  to cast  a vote
depending  on the legal  framework  of the election.  Each  vote  cast  upon
the token supplants  the older  one/s  cast  upon  the same token.  This  may
make  vote  buying  and  coercion  more  onerous  than  in postal  voting
procedures, where the paper-based election material may be used just once.
The argument  concerning  protection  against  premature  disclosure  works
the same way as with envelope protocols, a value of 1 is assigned.
7. CONCLUSION
This  paper  discussed  the effects  on the updated  Council  of Europe
Recommendation (2017)5 on e-voting protocol viability focussing on envelope
and  token  protocols.  A multi-dimensional  model  was  advanced
to systematically  map the abilities  of an e-voting protocol  against  the core
requirements  (dimensions)  of CM/Rec(2017)5.  A capabilities  frontier  was
defined  depending  on how  far  technical  safeguards  protect  each
of the dimensions;  beyond  that  only  organisational  safeguards  apply.
The paper then proceeded to present a typical envelope and a typical token
protocol  mapping  it  against  the multi-dimensional  model  showing  that
there  are  considerable  differences  between  the two  protocol  families
in achieving the requirements of CM/Rec(2017)5. 
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The main  weakness  of enveloping  is  the complete  absence  of general
verifiability  and  the necessity  to keep  the private  key  of the election
committee and the ballot box apart, as both together enable to break voting
secrecy  on a large  scale.  The token  protocol  protects  voting  secrecy
technically  and  enables  a very  high  degree  of individual  and  general
verifiability,  with  individual  verifiability  exceeding  the requirements
of CM/Rec(2017)5. 
As shown in the paper,  the question  of whether anonymization  occurs
before or after the insertion in the ballot box, is  a true watershed between
e-voting  protocols.  This  question  decides  about  the quality  of individual
verification,  the possibility  of a meaningful  independent  recount  and
the technical (not organisational) protection of voting secrecy. The authors
hold  that  CM/Rec(2017)5  accentuates  this  watershed.  In this  regard
the CM/Rec(2017)5  can  be  considered  a seminal  piece  of work
by the Council of Europe towards reliable e-voting.
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